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nterest rates have varied substantially in recent
years. Since 1981, for example, the monthly average
three-month Treasury bill rate has ranged between
5.18 percent and 16.30 percent while the Baa corpo-
ratebond rate ranged between 9.61 percent and 17.18
percent; the prime rate during this time reached a
high of 20.5 percent and fell to a low of 7.5 percent.
Interest rate movements are important, of course, be-
cause theyaffect the present value ofstreams offuture
payments, that is, wealth. Moreover,the risk ofinterest
rate changes is related directly to the level of interest
rates.’ During the l980s, therefore, firms and individ-
uals have faced substantial exposure to interest rate
risk.
There are at least two approaches that canbe taken
to reduce themagnitude ofthis problem. The firstis to
hedge interest rate risk, which has been discussed at
length in this Reviewand elsewhere.’ The second is to
forecast thelikely course of interest rates. This article
investigates the reliability of such forecasts in general
and assesses the specific usefulness of forecasts by
professional economists.
Michael T. Be/ongia is a senior economist at the Federal Reserve Bank
ofSt Louis. Paul Crosby providedresearch assistance.
‘Interest rate risk, for a firmwhose portfolio is composed ofstreams
of future receipts and payments,is measured by the interest elastic-
ity of the portfolio; for a single asset, this can be expressed as —nO!
1 + i), where n is theterm to maturity. A more general expression for
a portfolio of assets and liabilities is derived in Belongia and Santoni
(1987). In either case, the level of interest rate risk rises with the
interest rate.
‘See Belongia and Santoni (1984, 1985).
INTEREST HATE FORECASTS:
THEORY AND EVIDENCE
Given the popular attention that such forecasts
command, it is surprising to note what economic
theory says about them: they are unlikely to provide
accurate insights about the future. This argument is
stated clearlyby Zarnowitz:
It might be argued that these are forecasts of people
who study the economy (experts). which are quite
unlike the expectations of those who act in the econ-
omy agents).On the one hand, theexperts areusually
credited with more knowledge ofthe economy atlarge
than the agents have. On the other hand, the experts
are often charged with being less stronglymotivated to
predict optimally than the agents who are seen as
having more at stake.’
Economists, atleast on one level, lacksufficient incen-
tives to make forecasts that are more accurate than
information already available in the marketplace.
Moreover, previous studies have shown there is little
systematic difference among professional forecasts, at
least partly because they use to a large extent the
same data~ receive the same news, interact, and draw
upon a common pool of knowledge and techniques.”
The key issue, however, really is not whether ex-
perts have more (or better) information than the pub-
lic, but whether individualswho consistently canfore-
‘See Zarnowitz (1983), p.2.
‘See Zarnowitz (1986), p. 6, and the references cited therein.
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cast interest ratesmore accurately than the marketare
likelyto make theirforecasts public.The reason has to
do with individual self-interest. Quite simply, why
would anyone reveal valuable insight about the future
when he could increase his wealth directly by appro-
priately trading in financial markets using this infor-
mation?
If, for example, a personknew that the three-month
Treasury bill ratewould be 6.50 percent in December,
while the futures market currently priced it at 7.00
percent, theforecaster’s wealth gain would be limited
only by his ability to buy December Treasury bill
futures; in this example, he would make a profit of
$1,250 on every contract he could buy.’ Certainly, he
has no incentive to make the same forecast public
without appropriate compensation, at least until he
had takenas large a position in themarket as he could.
Ofcourse, forecasters may have incentivesto sellfore-
casts that are of no value to theirwealth; it isnot clear,
however, why other individuals would pay for such
predictions.
As a general rule, the accuracy of economic fore-
casts varies widely across variables. Previous research
has found that predictions of the three-month Trea-
sury bill rate six months into the future by major
commercial forecasters are within two percentage
points of the actual rate only 67 percent of the time.’
Thus, if in June, the three-month Treasury bill rate
was forecast to be 7 percent in December, there is only
a 0.67 probability that the actualDecember ratewould
be somewhere between 5 percent and 9 percent.
Other studies have shown that error statistics often
double in size when the forecast horizon is extended
as little as from one to two quarters ahead.7
The Efficient Markets Hypothesis and
Interest Rate Forecasts
A model of interest rate determination demon-
strates why individuals are unable (as opposed to
unwilling) to forecast interest rates more accurately,
on average, than the forecasts already implied by cur-
‘Treasury bill futures are priced by subtracting the Treasury bill
interest rate from 100. Thus, interest rates of7.00 and 6.50 percent
imply contract prices of 93.00 and 93.50, respectively. Moreover,
each basis-point change in the interest rate is worth $25 on the
valueof a contract. Buyingone contract at93.00 and selling at93.50
would show a simple profit of 50 basis points x $25 = $1,250,
abstracting from commission and other costs.
°McNees,p. 11.
7Typically, the criterion is root-mean-squared error (RMSE); see
McNees (1986). Also, see Zarnowitz (1983).
rent spot rates or prices in the interest rate futures
markets. This model, known as the efficient markets
model, states that the expected interest rate at some
specified future point in time, given all information
presently available, isequal to the current interest rate
plus whatever change in the interest rate is suggested
by currently available information.’
The driving force behind the efficient markets
model is the information available to traders in the
market and the incentives they have to use this infor-
mation. current market rates and expectations offu-
ture rates are influenced by changes in information
that affectexpectations about the future. Because new
information is unknown until it actually is released,
success in predicting future interest rates depends
upon predicting both future changes in the informa-
tion and the market’s reaction to such news.”
An illustration ofthe EfficientMarkets
Model
One illustration of the efficient markets model ap-
plied toactual data is the change in interestrates that
follows the weeklyFederal Reserve Ml announcement
that usually occurs at 4:30 p.m. [EST] each Thursday.
The assumption is that the interest rate at 3:30 p.m.,
just prior to the announcement, fully reflects all cur-
rently available information relevant to the Treasury
bill rate,includingvarious forecasts ofthe Fed’syet-to-
be-announced change in Ml; thus, the available infor-
mation at 3:30 p.m. includes both actual and predicted
data.
When the Fed announces the Ml change at 4:30
p.m., the market’s information set is revised with the
actual Ml change replacing its predicted value. If no
othersiguificant information isreleased until rates are
observed again at 5 p.m., the change in the Treasury
bill rate from 3:30 to 5 p.m. reflects the market’s reac-
tion to the news in the Ml announcement. If the
actual and predicted Ml values are different, the ef-
ficient markets model predicts that interest rates will
react to the new information in the Fed’s Ml an-
nouncement; many studies have found this result
empirically.9
‘The efficient markets model applied to interest rate determination
can be expressed as:
E(i,. ,Ill,) = i,(1 + E(i,+ , — ill!)),
where E is the expectations operator and fl is the information
available toagents at the time forecasts are made. For more detail
on this model, see Fama and Miller (1972) or Mishkin (1983).
‘See Sheehan (1985) and Belongia and Sheehan (1987) for a survey
and critique of these studies.
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This example demonstrates the major point of the
efficient markets model: changes in interest rates de-
pend on changes in information. A forecast that inter-
est rates will be higher six months from now than
what already is implied by the underlying term struc-
ture really is a forecast that new information will be
revealedwhich will cause market participants to raise
the rateof interest. Such forecasts are potentially use-
ful only if the forecasters consistently have better
information, on average,than the othermarketpartici-
pants generally possess. Or, to state the proposition
differently, a useful forecast is not simply an accurate
one; it alsomust tellsomethingabout the futurethat is
not already reflected in current market interest rates.
A COMPARISON OF INTEREST RATE
FORECASTS
A comparison ofalternative interest rate forecasts is
essentially a comparison ofinformation sets that fore-
casters possess. The futures market, as well as fore-
casts that simply assume thefuture will resemble the
present, provide useful alternatives to forecasts pro-
duced by specialized forecasting services. If all fore-
casts have similar accuracy, it would suggest that
market participants use essentially the same informa-
tion.
Survey Forecasts
The information content of economists’ forecasts is
intriguing for a variety of reasons. Presumably, their
specialized training gives them insight to theworkings
of financial markets. In return for their services, the
economists involved earn relatively large salaries;
moreover, some command considerable public atten-
tion. The latter group should include those whose
forecasts are among the best of competing alterna-
tives.
Market Forecasts
The futures market offers an interesting perspective
on forecasts. At a given point in time, individuals may
enter into agreements to buy or sell interest-sensitive
assets, such as Treasury bills, at adate as much astwo
years into the future. The collective actions of inves-
tors betting that interest rates will rise from today’s
level (who will sell Treasury bill futures short) and
investors betting that interest rates will fall (who will
buy, or go long in, Treasury bill futures) determine, at
each moment in time, the ‘market’s” expectation of
what interest rates will be at a specified future date.
Such forecasts are interesting for two reasons: they
reflect all available information held by market partici-
pants and these participants have a compelling rea-
son to forecast accurately. If they are wrong, the
moneylost is their own!
A naive or no-change model is an interesting third
alternative because, as previously noted, predicting
interest rates really involves predicting changes in
information and the market’s reaction to this news. If
one believes it is impossible to predict actions by
OPEC, changes in macroeconomic policy, revisions in
economic data and other factors that affect expecta-
tions of future interest rates, the best strategy would
be topredict no change in information and,hence, no
change in interest rates. Certainly, as the length of the
forecast horizon grows shorter, the probabilityoflarge
changes in information (andinterest rates) declinesas
well.
Sources ofForecasts: Professional and
Market Data
The six-month-ahead forecasts of the three-month
Treasury bill rate by nine economists surveyed regu-
larlyby the WallStreet Journalwere collected overthe
period December 1981 through June 1986. These fore-
casts, which are published on orabout each January 1
and July 1, yielded 10 forecast periods and 90 predic-
tions tobe evaluated. Eachforecastwas assumed to be
made the day before publlcation.b0
Comparable forecasts from the futures market were
derived by observing on June 30 the three-month
Treasury bill rate implied by the December Treasury
bill futures contract and on December 31 the rate
implied by the June contract. A larger sample to be
used later also employed observations on the March
futures contract from the previous September 30 and
on the September contract fromMarch 31. These data
were compared with actual Treasury bill rates on the
day the relevant futures contract ceased trading.11The
procedure yielded 40 observations, ofwhich 10 coin-
cided with dates of the economists’ forecasts. The
naive orno-change forecastwas obtained by observing
the spot Treasury bill rates on thelast business daysof
March, June, September and December and predict-
ing that same rate would exist on the last day of the
month six months hence. Again there are 40 observa-
“The full Wall StreetJournal survey includes many more economists,
but only nine individuals have responded consistently since the
initial survey in December 1981.
“Treasury bill futures contracts usually are liquidated in the third
week of their terminal months, not the last day ofthe month aswith
the economist forecasts.
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tions overthe 1977—86 interval with 10 coinciding with
dates oftheeconomist survey. Although thissample of
market-based forecasts includes only 10 observations
that coincide with the economists’ forecasts, it serves
as the basis for the first comparison. Subsequent anal-
ysis uses the entire sample backto 1977 for astronger
test of forecast accuracy.
Forecasts ofDirection ofChange
A first assessment about the accuracy of theprofes-
sional forecasts was made against a relatively weak
criterion, the predicted direction of change. That is, if
rates were forecast to increase (or decrease), did they?
The individual forecasts relative to subsequent actual
values are plotted in chart 1.
The 90 individual expert predictions correctly fore-
cast the direction of change on 38 occasions, or 42
percent of the time. If interest rate movements are
random, a 50 percent record of accuracy would be
expected.1z Only one of the nine forecasters guessed
“This type of performance — the strategies ofprofessional investors
yielding returns interiorto those of simple rules — is common. For
example, the mean equity fund managed by professional institu-
tional money managers rose 16.7 percent in 1986 compared with an
18.7 percent rise in the S&P 500 index. Moreover, more than 67
percent ofthe money managers produced returns in 1986 smaller
than the general increase in market values, as measured by the
S&P 500; see Wallace (1987). For a more extensive discussion of
this result and a similar finding of inferior performance by mutual
fund managers overtime, see Malkiel (1985), pp. 147—82, and the
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the direction of change correctly more than one-half
of the time; he was correct on six of 10 occasions.
Three others guessed the correct direction of change
on five of 10 occasions. The worst individual perfor-
mance was two correct predictions.
For the 40 quarterly predictions derived from fu-
tures market observations, 22, or nearly 55 percent
correctly forecast the direction of change. Over the
shorter 1982—86 sample, five of10 directions of change
were predicted correctly by thefutures market. On the
simple criterion of direction of change, the futures
market outperforms the economists surveyed.”
PointForecasts
A different criterionbywhich toevaluate forecasts is
a comparison of the point estimates of the predicted
changes in interest rates with the actual changes.
These comparisons were analyzed several ways. First,
forecasts by the nine experts provided 90 individual
predictions of the Treasury bill rate. These individual
predictions also could be aggregated to form a con-
sensus, or average,prediction forthe nine economists
at a specific moment in time. The performance ofthe
experts relative to the futures market and naive fore-
casts first was judged over the short 1982—86 sample
that coincidedwith the economist survey. Differences
between actual Treasury bill rates and, respectively,
the economist, futures market and naive forecasts
were calculated to generate values forforecast errors.
All errors were calculated as actual minus predicted
values. Table I shows the summary statistics for these
errors.
“There is no meaningful way to construct a direction-Qf-change
criterion for the naive forecast.
The entries in table I represent the mean absolute
error (MAE), meanerror and root-mean-squared error
(RMSE) from forecasts for the three-month Treasury
bill rate six months into the future. The first two rows
are associated with the individual and consensus fore-
casts from the survey of experts. The third row is
based on the differences between the actualTreasury
bill rateandthe futures market prediction, The fourth
row is based on the naive predictions, the differences
between current and previous actual rates.
The most interesting aspect of these summary sta-
tistics is their remarkable similarity. Of course, this
result was predicted by the earliertheoretical discus-
sion, which emphasized that all available information
would be reflectedin current market rates. The mean
errors for all forecasts are negative, indicating that
these methods tended to overestimate the interest
rate; the futures market, however, tended to be the
most bearish forecaster on this account by overpre-
dicting the Treasury bill rate an average of1.132 per-
centage points. MAE statistics also are similar, with a
rangeofabout 30basis points between the best (naive)
and worst (individual economist). The RlvtSE statistic,
which is a measure ofthe dispersion offorecasterrors,
shows thenaive and economist consensus to perform
best ~
‘2The likely explanation for thefutures prediction having the highest
AMSE is the method ofcalculation. The RMSE will tend to be lower
for forecasts that made many errors of a similar size relative to
forecasts that had smaller errors, on average, but had several very
large errors. This result occurs, ofcourse, because calculating the
RMSE involves squaring the forecast errors. The effects of random
variation in small samples also is a potential source of distortion.
Thus, two very large futuresmarket errors offset a record of gener-
ally accurate forecastsas indicated by otherstatistics.
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Error statistics from the longer 10-year sample of
quarterly observations described earlier are reported
in table 2. Because daily interest rate changes are
volatile and a large, one-day change could affect the
results, forecasts for a specific date also were com-
pared with the average Treasurybill rate for the week
in which that date occurred.
Relative to the previous results, the futures market
average errors declined substantially to near 15 basis
points, compared with the shortersample mean error
of about 113 basis points. MAE and RMSE values in-
creased slightly, however, for the longer sample. The
forecast errors do not appear to varywith the use of
daily orweekly average values for the terminal period
spot rate. The naive forecast also shows slight in-
creases in MAE and RMSE values but its mean error
falls about 50 basis points to near zero. Again, while
these statistics are not directly comparable with the
economist forecasts because of the different sample
periods, nothing in them suggests superior perfor-
mance by the economists.
Market Reaction to Forecasts
As a final check on the information content of the
expertforecasts, dailyTreasury bill rates were divided
into two groups: those for days when the experts’
forecasts were published and those for other trading
days. (Recallthat theforecasts are useful tothe market
only iftheyadd to the existing pool ofmarket informa-
tion.) To test whether this is true, equation (1) was
estimated:
(1)Tfl, = 0.015 + 0.998Th,. + 0.049 ANNOUNCEMENT + e,,
(1.02) (657.2) (0.95)
It’ = 0.99 DW = 1.77
where the daily value of the Treasury bill rate (TB,) is
regressed on the previous day’s value (TB,,) and a
dummyvariable (ANNOUNCEMENT) that takes a value
of one on the 11 days that the expert forecasts were
released.” If the expert forecasts add to the market’s
information, the coefficient for the ANNOUNCEMENT
variable should be significantly different from zero; as
the t-statisticof0.95 reveals, however,we cannotreject
the hypothesis that the forecast announcements have
no effect on Treasury bill rates. Apparently, the Trea-
sury bill market had already incorporated the infor-
mationunderlying these forecasts prior to their public
release.
Interest rate risk has been substantial in the 1980s,
and, by no coincidence, the demand for interest rate
forecasts has increased. There are strong theoretical
reasons to believe, however, that such forecasts are
subject to large errors. Moreover, anyone who could
predict interest rates more accurately, on average,
than other market participants would have no reason
to make his forecasts publicly. Comparisons of inter-
est rate forecasterrors support the notion that several
market-based forecasts, using information easily ac-
cessible to the general public, predict the Treasury bill
rate six months into the future as well as a panel of
prominent forecasters.
Why, then, do economists make public forecasts of
interest rates and seemingly earn large salaries for
doing so? Several explanations related to other pri-
mary functions of corporate economists seem plausi-
ble. First, economists may serve an advertising func-
tion for their firms: they are paid, in part, to get the
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firm’s name mentioned in the press often, and fore-
casting interest rates is one way to achieve this end.
Second, economists may provide a managerial insur-
ance function. Ifa business decision has the potential
to causelargelosses, managers whohaverelied on the
input of economists cannot be held negligent, in the
sense of actingwithout seeking “the best information
available at thetime.” Finally, forecastinginterest rates
may be a trivial portion of an economist’s overall
function; his compensation may be based primarily
on analyticalperformance inotherareas. Itis unlikely,
however, that economists are employed primarily for
their ability to predict interest rates more accurately
thanthe market.
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